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Abstract 
Members of the general population have high expectations of people who are asked to 
corroborate an alibi for the suspect of a crime.  The general belief is that it is easy to 
provide an alibi if a person is innocent, and therefore guilt should be assumed when an 
alibi cannot be provided.  The possibility that having to generate an alibi oneself could 
influence expectations was examined.  Additionally, potential changes in opinion after 
being provided with positive or negative feedback were explored.  Results showed a 
significant difference in expectations based on whether participants were correct or 
incorrect in identifying the suspect, that is, whether participants were able to provide an 
alibi.  Those who were incorrect had lower expectations of themselves and of others than 
those who were correct.  Making jurors aware of the difficulty in providing an alibi may 
lead to fairer treatment of suspects who have difficulty providing one.
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Effect of Experience on Alibi Generation and Expectation 
The justice system is a structure put in place to both protect the public and to 
penalize those who break the law.  Members of the general public rely quite heavily on 
the efficiency and success of the justice system, as flaws or errors in judgment may 
directly affect them.  For example, a person who is guilty of murder, but is released based 
on some judicial error, poses a threat to the public.  This type of error is severe, and law 
enforcement and justice system personnel tend to take the utmost caution that such an 
error does not occur Pozzulo, Bennell, & Forth, 2015).  That being said, there are many 
cases in which the suspect on trial is innocent, but has no form of hard evidence to prove 
that he/she is innocent (Pozzulo et al., 2015).  In these cases, the suspect often relies on 
alibi witnesses (people who provide a suspect with an alibi) to corroborate his or her 
whereabouts during the time of the crime, which should offer strong enough evidence 
that guilt is disproven.  Unfortunately, there is a deficit in research and a clear bias among 
the general public in regards to the believability of evidence that an alibi witness 
provides. 
There is a common misconception that if a person is innocent, providing a strong 
alibi should be fairly simple; however, this is not the case.  In a review of 333 cases of 
DNA exonerations in the United States, it was found that many, if not most of the 
innocent suspects had provided some form of an alibi (innocenceproject.org, 2016).  This 
is evidence that either suspects were unable to provide a strong alibi, or that the 
expectations that people have about alibi strength are flawed.  For example, research 
shows that discussions of an event are seen as more believable if the person providing 
recall is consistent in retelling the event on multiple occasions (Dysart & Strange, 2012).  
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Yet, a study conducted by Strange, Dysart, and Loftus (2015) showed that it was far more 
common for an alibi to be inconsistent than consistent upon repetition; that is to say, it is 
likely that even an alibi generated by an innocent person about an event that did in fact 
happen will be told differently each time.  Results showed that over the course of the 
study, which consisted of multiple interviews pertaining to the alibi, no more than 50% of 
the participants were consistent across the span of the study (Strange et al., 2015).  It is 
safe to assume the lack in consistency will have a negative effect on believability and 
thus on verdicts.  
There are two main forms of alibi corroboration, each with varying levels of 
perceived strength or believability.  The two forms are physical corroboration and person 
corroboration, both of which have multiple categories that influence believability.  The 
strongest perceived form of alibi corroboration is physical (Olson & Wells, 2012).  This 
refers to any irrefutable, concrete evidence that proves the suspect could not have been 
present at the crime scene when the crime took place (Olsen & Wells, 2004).  Receipts, 
security cameras, or any time-stamped document are considered physical corroboration 
of an alibi.  Of these, video surveillance is seen as the strongest form of physical 
corroboration, followed by time-stamped documents and receipts, respectively (Olsen & 
Wells, 2004). Unfortunately, it is uncommon for suspects of a crime to find physical 
proof of their whereabouts at the time.  The second form of alibi corroboration is person 
corroboration, which is perceived as a weaker form of evidence amongst alibi evaluators.  
A person corroborated alibi is divided into three categories: motivated familiar other, 
non-motivated familiar other, or non-motivated stranger (Olsen & Wells, 2004).  
Motivated familiar other refers to a person who has any sort of relationship with the 
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suspect to the extent that it is plausible that he/she would lie for the suspect.  This can 
include family members or friends.  Non-motivated familiar other refers to a person who 
knows who the suspect is, but has no emotional relationship with him or her, and thus 
would have no motivation to lie for the suspect.  This could be a bartender of the bar at 
which the suspect frequents.  Finally, a non-motivated stranger alibi refers to a person 
who does not know the suspect at all, and thus would gain or lose nothing by 
corroborating a story for the suspect.  This could be any person who has encountered the 
suspect.  Data shows that, of person corroboration, motivated familiar other, non-
motivated familiar other, and non-motivated stranger are least believable to most 
believable, respectively (Strange et al., 2014).  Although physical corroboration is seen as 
the strongest form of alibi evidence, studies show that there is still a significant level of 
skepticism among the general public in relationship to the believability of alibi witnesses 
in the justice system (Olson & Wells, 2012). 
Errors in memory have been shown to be a major factor in the ability of both a 
suspect to find an alibi, and for said alibi to corroborate the suspect’s story (Lew, Pashler, 
& Vul, 2015).  Research suggests that it is quite difficult to generate an alibi, especially if 
the event took place an extended amount of time prior to the trial (Lew et al., 2015).  
There are vast amounts of errors in memory such as imprecise estimates, misassociations, 
or complete forgetting (Lew et al., 2015).   
What people fail to consider is that alibi witnesses, especially strangers, are not 
expecting to be asked to provide an alibi, and thus are not likely to remember details 
about certain times or individuals with whom they have no relationship.  A suspect may 
claim to have been at a bar at the time of the crime, but the bartender may have no 
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recollection of seeing the person, and if he/she does remember, it may be to a very small 
extent with minimal detail.  This is the issue with the idea that alibi generation is simple.  
Alibi evaluators and the general public tend to disbelieve alibi witnesses who are friends 
or family of the suspect due to the belief that relationship closeness will cause people to  
lie to protect the accused (Marion & Burke, 2013).  However, a friend or family member 
is more likely to have been with the suspect at the time of the crime, and is also more 
likely to remember specific details.  A stranger may not remember seeing the person 
because there is no recognition cue upon interaction with the suspect, or may lack the 
attention to detail that one needs to pay in order to remember a stranger.  That being said, 
it appears to be an impossible situation for a suspect who is trying to provide a strong 
alibi to disprove guilt.   
Supporting this, a recent study looked at the ability of an innocent person to 
corroborate an alibi for a certain date at a certain time (Olson & Charman, 2012).  The 
participants were asked to generate an alibi for an event, and to then corroborate their 
alibi after 48 hours (Olson & Charman, 2012).  For example, participants may have gone 
shopping by themselves and spent an hour at a particular store, and then went back to ask 
someone who was present to verify their being at that location at a certain point in time.  
Results showed that, although all events were verified, the participants had difficulty 
corroborating their alibis with any evidence, and those alibis that were corroborated were 
weak (Olson & Charman, 2012). Even strong alibis yield skepticism, so it is safe to 
assume that weak alibi witnesses will provide little to no help to suspects, regardless of 
innocence or guilt.  
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This was highlighted in Olson and Wells’ (2012) study which looked at 
believability of an alibi based on two types of corroboration: person or physical.   
Although physical corroboration such as video recordings or receipts at the time of the 
crime was seen as more believable than person corroboration, results showed that on a 
believability scale of 0-10, a suspect with security camera physical corroboration 
combined with a stranger’s person corroboration only resulted in a believability rating of 
7.4. This points to a clear prejudice among members of the general population regarding 
the perceived believability of alibi witnesses.  The general population seems to lean 
toward disbelief of suspects when alibi witnesses are the only form of evidence (i.e., 
there is no physical evidence) which is indicative of a flaw in perceptions versus a flaw in 
alibi witnesses themselves.  
In the previously mentioned Olson and Wells (2012) study, the believability of 
alibis based on whether or not a person had been asked to generate an alibi was 
examined.  The study consisted of three conditions: participants either generated an alibi 
themselves, heard an alibi from a suspect, or read about the difficulty of generating an 
alibi.  The results showed that the participants who generated their own alibi found the 
suspect’s alibi more believable.  This is important because there is an obvious lack of 
knowledge of the difficulty that most people have in generating an alibi.  Thirty-six 
percent of the participants who were asked to generate and corroborate an alibi had to re-
evaluate after the 48 hours they were given to provide evidence; some had mistaken their 
whereabouts at the time of the event, and others were unable to find any evidence to 
support their original story (Olsen & Wells, 2012). A downfall of this study is that the 
expectations of the alibi witnesses themselves were not investigated.  The expectations of 
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the suspect in corroborating an alibi were noted, however the expectations of what an 
alibi should provide in order to be seen as believable was left unaddressed.  
Not only has it been shown that the justice system holds high expectations for 
suspects in their ability to provide an alibi, it has been shown that the justice system 
frequently dismisses corroborated alibis once they have been provided (Culhane et al., 
2013).  This was demonstrated in the case of Stephen Avery, a man who was accused of a 
crime who provided 16 corroborated alibis, and was still convicted for the crime for 
which he was eventually proven to be innocent (Strange et al., 2015).  Considering a 
person who had 16 alibi witnesses was unable to prove his innocence, it is of great 
concern for those who are unable to generate an alibi at all, whether they are innocent or 
not.  Even the cases in which there are alibi witnesses who are able and willing to 
corroborate a suspect’s story, research shows that the label of ‘alibi’ raises skepticism in 
the eyes of the general public (Olsen, 2013).  This points to the aforementioned prejudice 
against alibis that the members of the general population hold.  Since it is such a new area 
of research, it is imperative that more studies be conducted to enhance the knowledge and 
understanding of alibi witnesses and the reasons for the prejudice against them.  In 
particular, expectations of what an alibi witness should be able to provide, and the 
perceived ease of an innocent person generating an alibi appear to be large factors that 
affect alibi believability.   
The current study was designed to investigate what people expect an alibi to 
remember and whether or not it would be beneficial for the public to gain experience in 
alibi generation in order to be more understanding of the difficulty in finding and 
corroborating an alibi.  In addition, the possibility of differences in expectations of alibi 
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witnesses across gender was examined.  It is a common belief that females tend to have 
more accurate autobiographical and detail-oriented memory than do men; this includes 
autobiographical information, attention to detail about others and events, and vivid 
memories of events (Grysman & Hudson, 2013).  With this taken into consideration, it 
was thought that it would be beneficial to investigate whether or not the general public 
has assumptions that a female alibi would be more inclined to remember more details 
about the ‘suspect’ than would a male alibi.  If this is the case, a jury may be less likely to 
believe a female alibi who insists she does not remember details than a male alibi who 
insists he does not remember details.  
There were three main hypotheses.  The first hypothesis was that the participants 
would be more likely to disbelieve the suspect before they had the opportunity to 
generate an alibi themselves.  This would be shown both through general disbelief and a 
high expectation of him being able to remember specific details of his location and the 
people he met.  Based on previous literature, specifically by Olsen and Wells (2012), it 
was hypothesized that the majority of participants would be more inclined to disbelieve 
the suspect than to believe the suspect.  
The second hypothesis was that the participants would have varying expectations 
of what a witness should be expected to remember about the suspect, what a bartender 
should be expected to remember about the suspect, and what the participant him or 
herself should be expected to remember about the suspect had they been at the scene of 
the alibi the suspect was claiming at the time of the crime.  Based on previous research, it 
was hypothesized that people would expect more from others (witness and bartender) 
than themselves. 
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The third hypothesis was that there would be a difference in participants’ 
perception of their own ability to provide an alibi based on whether they correctly or 
incorrectly identified the suspect in the lineup provided, thus having received either 
positive or negative feedback.  Based on previous research, it was hypothesized that the 
participants who were incorrect in identifying the suspect in the lineup would rate their 
own ability to provide an alibi as lower than people who were correct in identifying the 
suspect and those who correctly recognized the suspect was not in the lineup.  This 
hypothesis parallels results found by Olsen and Wells (2012) in which people who were 
asked to generate an alibi for themselves, had difficulty doing so, and thus changed their 
opinion on the ease of generating alibis.  
The current study was also designed to take gender of the witness, gender of the 
bartender, and the participants’ own gender into consideration.  Since there was no 
current literature available that investigated differences in expectations of alibis based on 
gender, no hypotheses with respect to gender differences were generated at this time.   
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Method 
Participants 
A convenience sample of 314 participants volunteered to take part in the study. 
Fifty-two were men (Mage = 27.29, SD = 9.90), 225 were women (Mage = 23.85, SD = 
11.32), 3 identified as a gender other than male or female, and 34 did not indicate a 
gender.  All participants were over the age of 19 unless they were university students, in 
which case they were considered mature minors.  Consent was obtained prior to 
participation (See Appendix A). 
Materials 
Photos. A photograph of 17 men standing in a bar was used (see Appendix B). 
The photograph was taken in an Irish bar at night, with moderate lighting, with the 17 
men separated into small groups, drinking and talking to each other. The photograph was 
a candid shot, with the men being told to not actively look at the camera, and to act as 
they normally would at a bar.  
Two six-person lineups were constructed (See Appendix C), which showed a 
front on image and a profile image of each of the men. The photographs show the men 
from the chest region upwards.  Each photograph was taken on a neutral-coloured 
background.  As there was no need to match the men to the suspect, the photos are of 
random men that one might expect to see at a bar on a typical evening.  One lineup, the 
suspect present lineup, showed one of the men who was in the original bar photo. The 
man in the original photograph was wearing different clothing than he was wearing in the 
bar. In the second lineup, the suspect absent lineup, the ‘suspect’s’ photo was replaced 
with photos of a man who was not present in the original bar photo.   
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Scenario. The scenario described a fictitious crime that took place close to the bar 
where the photo was taken. The scenario stated that a woman was robbed by an unknown 
man close to the bar. The suspect claimed he was at the bar during the time of the crime 
(See Appendix D).  
Questionnaire. The questionnaire was based on the bar photo and scenario 
described above (See Appendix E).  It included questions rated on a 7-point Likert scale 
(e.g., where 1 is ‘not at all’ or ‘not likely’ and 7 is ‘very much’ or ‘very likely’). To assess 
overall believability, the four questions of interest were as follows: ‘What is the 
likelihood that the suspect was at the bar at the time of the crime?’; ‘How believable is 
the suspect when he says he cannot remember any information about the bar?’; ‘How 
reasonable is it that the suspect said he cannot remember what time he was drinking at the 
bar?’; and ‘If the suspect truly did not know people from the bar, what is the likelihood 
that he would remember the people that he met?’.  
To assess whether or not participants had different expectations of what a witness 
should be expected to remember of the suspect, what a bartender should be expected to 
remember of the suspect, and what the participant him or herself should be expected to 
remember of the suspect (before vs. after the lineup), the following questions were asked: 
‘What is the likelihood that the (witness/bartender/participant) can vouch for the suspect 
being at the bar at the time of the crime?’; ‘What is the likelihood that the 
(witness/bartender/participant) can describe the suspect?’; What is the likelihood that the 
(witness/bartender/participant) can remember the suspect’s eye colour?’; ‘What is the 
likelihood that the (witness/bartender/participant) can remember the suspect’s height?’, 
  11 
 
and ‘What is the likelihood that the (witness/bartender/participant) can remember the 
suspect’s clothing?’. 
Procedure 
The survey described was posted online. Participants were recruited through 
social media sites, email, and through introductory psychology courses at Grenfell 
Campus. People who were interested in participating were given a link to the survey, at 
which point they saw the informed consent screen.  As participants were informed, 
clicking next on this screen meant consent was assumed, and participants were presented 
with the survey. Participants were first told to observe the photograph of some men who 
were at a local bar. The participants were asked to count the number of individuals that 
they saw in the photograph to ensure that they had looked at the photograph.  
The first question asked the participants whether or not they recognized/knew any 
of the men in the photograph.  If they answered ‘yes’, they were directed to a screen 
where they were thanked for their participation and given reasoning as to why they were 
unable to complete the survey.  The participants who did not recognize anyone in the 
original photograph were then presented with the scenario described above, and were 
asked to answer questions pertaining to the believability of the suspect based on his alibi.  
Next, the participants were shown photographs of six men, half of the participants 
received the suspect present lineup and half of the participants received the suspect 
absent lineup (See Appendix C).  
Participants could choose one of the photos or say that none of the individuals 
were at the bar at the time. If the participants correctly identified the suspect, they were 
provided feedback indicating that they were able to provide an alibi. If the participants 
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chose a person as being in the group photo who was not, they were given feedback saying 
that they potentially provided a guilty person with an alibi.  If the participants claimed the 
person was not in the group photo and he was, they were informed that they were unable 
to provide an alibi for the suspect. Finally, if the participants did not choose anyone, and 
the ‘suspect’ was not in the lineup, they were told they were correct in their decision. 
Following the lineup task, additional questions were presented for the participants 
to answer in order to determine whether their perceptions of the ease in generating an 
alibi changed.  Finally, the participants were thanked for their participation and were 
directed to a page that contained a short debriefing about the study and contact 
information for the researchers (See Appendix F).  
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Results 
As noted in the introduction, this study was conducted to see whether there would 
be a difference in expectations among participants before having to generate an alibi, and 
after having to generate an alibi.  The results are organized by area of interest, of which 
there were three: overall believability of the suspect, perceived ability to describe the 
suspect from the perspective of a witness, a bartender, and the participant him or herself, 
and the effect of the message received (accuracy/inaccuracy of the participant when 
asked to identify the suspect’s presence or absence in a lineup) on expectations of a 
witness, a bartender, and the participant him or herself. Gender differences were also 
investigated. 
Believability of Suspects  
The overall believability of a suspect accused of a crime was first assessed.  
Figure 1 shows participants’ responses to the questions assessing perceptions of the 
suspects’ believability.  On a scale of 1-7 (where 1 is ‘not at all’ or ‘not likely’ and 7 is 
‘very much’ or ‘very likely’), average believability was 4.18 (SD = 1.46).  A MANOVA 
was completed with gender and accuracy of decision as between subjects variables and 
the questions about suspect believability as dependent variables.  It should be noted that 
the purpose of using the accuracy of the participants’ decision as a between subjects 
variable was to identify any potential differences in the decision making process.  
Participants were asked about believability before they knew whether or not they were 
accurate, so comparisons were made to investigate possible differences in the decision 
making process for participants who eventually learned they were accurate versus those 
who learned they were inaccurate.  Results showed that there was a main effect of 
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accuracy of decision, F(4, 272) = 4.48, p = .002; Wilk’s λ = 0.94, ηp
2  
= .06, and an 
interaction between gender and accuracy of decision, F(4, 272) = 3.14, p = .015, Wilk’s λ 
= 0.96, ηp
2  
= .04.  There was no main effect of gender for believability responses.  
Follow-up ANOVAs with accuracy of decision as the between subjects variable and the 
different questions as dependent variables were conducted to see where differences in 
believability existed.  
There was a significant effect of accuracy of decision for two questions.  First, 
‘What is the likelihood that the suspect was at the bar at the time of the crime?’, F(1, 275) 
= 5.35, p = .021, ηp
2  
= .02.  People who were accurate in identifying the suspect (M = 
4.41, SD = 1.51) were more likely to believe that the suspect was at the bar at the time of 
the crime than those who were inaccurate (M = 3.90, SD = 1.42; mean difference = 0.52, 
p = .021, 95% CI [0.07, 0.96]).  There was also a significant effect for the question ‘If the 
suspect truly did not know people from the bar, what is the likelihood that he would 
remember the people that he met?’, F(1, 275) = 5.67, p = .018, ηp
2  
= .02.  People who 
were inaccurate (M = 3.80, SD = 1.54) were more likely to believe that the suspect was at 
the bar at the time of the crime than those who were accurate (M = 3.24, SD = 1.50; mean 
difference = 0.56, p = .018, 95% CI [0.10, 1.0]).  The results for the main effect of 
accuracy of decision for the likelihood of the suspect being at the bar at the time of the 
crime must be viewed with caution, as there was a significant interaction.   
There was a significant interaction between gender and accuracy of decision,  
F(1, 275) = 6.68, p = .010, ηp
2  
= .02.  Follow-up ANOVAs showed for men there was a 
significant effect for the question ‘What is the likelihood that the suspect was at the bar at 
the time of the crime?’, F(1, 52) = 7.0, p = .011, ηp
2  
= .12.  Men who answered 
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accurately (M = 4.61, SD = 1.78) were more likely to believe that the suspect was at the 
bar at the time of the crime than males who answered inaccurately (M = 3.52, SD= 1.26; 
mean difference = 1.10, p = .011, 95% CI [0.26, 1.90]).  For women, there was no 
significant difference across accuracy for the question ‘What is the likelihood that the 
suspect was at the bar at the time of the crime?’, F(1, 224) = 0.12, p = .740, ηp
2
 = .01.  
Females who were accurate (M = 4.22, SD = 1.47) did not answer significantly 
differently than females who were inaccurate (M = 4.28, SD = 1.42).  
Witness/Bartender/Personal Ability to Describe 
 Perceived differences in the ability of the witness, the bartender, and the 
participant him or herself to describe the suspect based on gender and accuracy of 
decision were assessed.  Figure 2 shows the participants’ perceptions of the likelihood 
that these individuals would remember specific information about the suspect.  A series 
of MANOVAs were completed with gender and accuracy of decision as between subjects 
variables and questions about the perceived accuracy of description of the witness, 
bartender, and the participant, respectively, as dependent variables.  There were no 
significant gender or accuracy of decision differences pertaining to the abilities of the 
witness, therefore discussion of just the results for the bartender and participant follow.  
Bartender.  Results showed that there was a main effect of gender for the 
bartender’s perceived ability to describe the suspect, F(6, 266) = 2.95, p = .008; Wilk’s λ 
= 0.94, ηp
2  
= .06.  Follow-up ANOVAs showed that there were significant effects for the 
questions ‘What is the likelihood that the bartender could provide a description of the 
suspect if the bartender spoke to him at the bar?’, F(1, 271) = 4.98, p = .026, ηp
2  
= .02; 
‘How likely is it that the bartender would remember the colour of the suspect’s eyes?’, 
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F(1, 271) = 4.24, p = .040, ηp
2  = .02; and ‘How likely is it that the bartender would 
remember what the suspect was wearing?’, F(1, 271) = 9.78, p = .002, ηp
2  
= .04.  
Pairwise comparisons showed that males (M = 5.04, SD = 1.41) were more likely to 
believe that the bartender could provide a description of the suspect if the bartender spoke 
to him at the bar than would females (M = 4.56, SD = 1.43; mean difference = 0.48, p = 
.026, 95% CI [0.06, 0.90]).  Males (M = 3.13, SD = 1.60) were more likely to believe that 
the bartender would remember the colour of the suspect’s eyes than females (M = 2.67, 
SD = 1.42; mean difference = 4.59, p = .040, 95% CI [0.02, 0.90]).  Finally, males (M = 
4.44, SD = 1.50) were more likely to believe that the bartender would remember what the 
suspect was wearing than females (M = 3.73, SD = 1.50; mean difference = 0.72, p = 
.002, 95% CI [0.27, 1.17]).  
Participant.  There was a main effect of accuracy of decision for the participants’ 
own ability to describe the suspect, F(5, 272) = 4.84, p < .001; Wilk’s λ = 0.92, ηp
2  
= .08.  
Follow-up ANOVAs showed that for accuracy of decision, there were significant effects 
for the questions ‘What is the likelihood that you could provide a description of the 
suspect if you spoke to him at the bar?’, F(1, 276) = 17.48, p < .001, ηp
2  = .06; ‘How 
likely is it that you would remember how tall the suspect was?’ F(1,276) = 6.74, p = .010, 
ηp
2 = .02; and ‘How likely is it that you would remember what the suspect was wearing?’, 
F(1, 276) = 4.65, p = .032, ηp
2
 = .02.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that the participants 
who accurately identified the suspect (M = 4.29, SD = 1.60) were more likely to believe 
that they could provide a description of the suspect at the bar than those who did not 
accurately identify the suspect (M = 3.28, SD = 1.61; mean difference = 1.01, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.54, 1.49]).  Participants who accurately identified the suspect (M = 3.85, SD = 
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1.58) were more likely to believe that they could remember how tall the suspect was than 
those who did not accurately identify the suspect (M = 3.22, SD = 1.62; mean difference 
= 0.63, p = .010, 96% CI [0.15, 1.11]).  Finally, participants who accurately identified the 
suspect (M = 3.7, SD = 1.56) were more likely to believe that they could remember what 
the suspect was wearing than those who did not accurately identify the suspect (M = 3.19, 
SD = 1.57; mean difference = 0.51, p = .032, 95% CI [0.04, 0.97]).  
There was also a significant main effect of gender for participants’ perceived 
ability to describe the suspect, F(5, 272) = 2.32, p = .044; Wilk’s λ = .96, ηp
2  
= .041.  
Follow-up ANOVAs revealed that for gender, there were significant effects for the 
questions ‘What is the likelihood that you could provide a description of the suspect if 
you spoke to him at the bar?’, F(1, 276) = 10.02, p = .002, ηp
2  = .04; ‘How likely is it that 
you would remember the colour of the suspect’s hair?’, F(1, 276) = 10.06, p = .002, ηp
2  
= 
.04, ‘How likely is it that you would remember how tall the suspect was?’, F(1, 276) = 
6.13, p = .014, ηp
2  = .022, and ‘How likely is it that you would remember what the 
suspect was wearing?’, F (1, 276) = 6.20, p = .013, ηp
2  
= .02.  Pairwise comparisons 
showed that men (M = 4.17, SD = 1.66) were more likely to believe that they could 
provide a description of the suspect than women (M = 3.40, SD = 1.67 ; mean difference 
= 0.77, p = .002, 95% CI [0.29, 1.24]). Men (M = 4.24, SD = 1.72) were more likely to 
believe they could remember the colour of the suspect’s hair than women (M = 3.44, SD 
= 1.69 ; mean difference = 0.80, p = .002, 95% CI [0.30,1.29]). Men (M = 3.84, SD = 
1.63) were more likely to believe they could remember how tall the suspect was than 
women (M = 3.24, SD = 1.62 ; mean difference = 0.60, p = .014, 95% CI [0.12, 1.07]), 
and men (M = 3.74, SD = 1.46) were more likely to believe that they would remember 
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what the suspect was wearing than women (M = 3.15, SD = 1.61; mean difference = 0.59, 
p =.013, 95% CI [0.12, 1.05]). 
Comparison of Witness, Bartender, and Participant   
Perceived differences in the ability to provide an alibi based on who was 
providing the alibi: a witness, a bartender, or the participant him or herself were also 
examined.  The following represent perceived differences in the ability to describe the 
suspect across the individual described as the alibi (witness, bartender, and participant).  
Ability to vouch.  There was a significant effect of perceived ability to vouch for 
the suspect being at the bar based on whether the person who was vouching was the 
witness, the bartender, or the participant him/herself. Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 18.41, p < .001, therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .94), 
F(1.88, 526.38) = 89.76, p < .001, ηp
2  
= .24.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants believed that the bartender (M = 4.70, SD = 1.52) would be better able to 
vouch for the suspect being at the bar than both the witness (M = 3.81, SD =1.38 ; mean 
difference = 0.93, p < .001, 95% CI [0.63, 1.22]) and the participants themselves (M = 
2.70, SD = 1.56 ; mean difference = 1.86, p < .001, 95% CI [1.49, 2.23]), and that the 
witness would be better able to vouch for the suspect being at the bar than the participants 
themselves (mean difference = 0.94, p < .001, 95% CI [0.60, 1.27]).  
Ability to describe.  There was a significant effect of perceived ability to provide 
a description based on whether the person providing the description was the witness, the 
bartender, or the participant him/herself.  Mauchly’s test indicated that the assumption of 
sphericity had been violated χ2(2) = 13.11, p = .001, therefore degrees of freedom were 
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corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .96), F(1.91, 535.43) = 
36.95, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .12.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that participants believed that 
the bartender (M = 4.59, SD = 1.45)  would be better able to provide a description of the 
suspect than both the witness (M = 4.41, SD = 1.35 ; mean difference = 0.31, p = .024, 
95% CI [0.03, 0.59]) and the participant themselves (M = 3.45, SD = 1.68; mean 
difference = 1.07, p < .001, 95% CI [0.73, 1.41]), and that the witness would be better 
able to provide a description of the suspect than the participants themselves (mean 
difference = 0.76, p < .001, 95% CI [0.45, 1.06]). The main effect of gender should be 
viewed with caution as there was a significant interaction. 
The significant interaction was between the person providing the description and 
gender of the participant, F(1.91, 535.43) = 3.92, p = .022, ηp
2 
= .01.  Follow-up 
ANOVAs revealed that for men, there was a significant difference in perceived ability to 
describe the suspect based on the person providing the description, F(2, 108) = 7.78, p = 
.001, ηp
2  
= .13.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that male participants (M = 3.91, SD = 
1.66) believed that the bartender (M = 4.77, SD = 1.41) should be better able to provide a 
description of the suspect than they themselves should be (mean difference = 0.91, p = 
.002, 95% CI [0.29, 1.53]).  For women, there was a significant difference in perceived 
ability to describe the suspect based on person providing the description. Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated χ2(2) = 11.09, p = .004, 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε = .95), F(1.91, 431.26) = 72.47, p < .001, ηp
2  
= .24, but pairwise 
comparisons revealed that women (M = 3.70, SD = 1.67) believed that the bartender (M = 
4.52, SD = 1.43) should be better able to provide a description of the suspect than both 
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they themselves should be (mean difference = 1.23, p < .001, 95% CI [0.93, 1.53]), and 
that the witness should be (M = 4.46, SD = 1.31; mean difference = 1.115, p < .001, 95% 
CI [0.85, 1.38]).  
Suspect’s hair colour.  There was a significant effect of perceived ability to 
remember the colour of the suspect’s hair based on whether the person providing the 
description was the witness, the bartender, or the participant him/herself.  Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 7.38, p = .030, 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε = .97), F(1.95, 541.76) = 9.183, p < .001, ηp
2 
 = .03.  Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that participants believed that the witness (M = 4.14, SD = 1.47) should be better 
able to remember the suspect’s hair colour than the participants themselves (M = 3.81, SD 
= 1.73; mean difference =0.33, p = .028, 95% CI [0.03, 0.62]), and that the bartender 
should be better able to remember the suspect’s hair colour than the participants 
themselves (M = 4.33, SD = 1.54; mean difference = 0.52, p < .001, 95% CI [0.21, 0.84]).  
Suspect’s eye colour.  There was a significant effect of perceived ability to 
remember the colour of the suspect’s eyes based on whether the person providing the 
description was the witness, the bartender, or the participant him/herself.  Mauchly’s test 
indicated that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 9.08, p = .01, 
therefore degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of 
sphericity (ε = .97), F(1.94, 540.63) = 29.99, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .10.  Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that participants believed that the bartender (M = 2.91, SD = 1.44) would be 
better able remember the suspect’s eye colour than both the witness (M = 2.47, SD = 
1.23; mean difference = 0.44, p < .001, 95% CI [0.22, 0.66]) and the participants 
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themselves (M = 2.16, SD = 1.26)  (mean difference = 0.75, p < .001, 95% CI [0.49, 
1.00]), and that the witness would be better able to remember the suspect’s eye colour 
than the participants themselves (mean difference = 0.31, p = .004, 95% CI [0.08, 0.54]).  
Suspect’s height.  There was a significant effect of perceived ability to remember 
the suspect’s height based on whether the person providing the description was the 
witness, the bartender, or the participant him/herself.  Mauchly’s test indicated that the 
assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 11.88, p = .003, therefore degrees of 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = .96), 
F(1.92, 533.60) = 9.14, p < .001, ηp
2  
= .03.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants believed the witness (M = 3.79, SD = 1.41) would be better able to remember 
the suspect’s height than the participants themselves (M = 3.49, SD = 1.64; mean 
difference = 0.30, p = .020, 95% CI [0.04, 0.57]), and that the bartender (M = 3.97, SD = 
1.57) would be better able to remember the suspect’s height than the participants 
themselves (mean difference = 0.48, p < .001, 95% CI [0.18, 0.79]).  
Suspect’s clothing.  There was a significant effect of perceived ability to 
remember the suspect’s clothing based on whether the person providing the description 
was the witness, the bartender, or the participant him/herself.  Mauchly’s test indicated 
that the assumption of sphericity had been violated, χ2(2) = 11.73, p = .003, therefore 
degrees of freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε = 
.96), F(1.92, 535.85) = 17.66, p < .001, ηp
2  
= .06.  Pairwise comparisons revealed that 
participants believed that the bartender (M = 4.07, SD = 1.53) would be better able to 
remember the suspect’s clothing than both the witness (M = 3.72 , SD = 1.40) (mean 
difference = 0.35, p = .002, 95% CI [0.11, 0.59]) and the participants themselves (M = 
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3.40, SD = 1.60; mean difference = 0.67, p < .001, 95% CI [0.39, 0.96]), and that the 
witness would be better able to remember the suspect’s clothing than the participants 
themselves (mean difference = 0.32, p = .021, 95% CI [0.04, 0.61]).  
Effects of Message Received 
 The final area of interest was whether or not the message received by the 
participant after identifying the suspect would have an effect on the answers that the 
participants provided about their own ability to provide an alibi.  Gender was also a 
subject of interest for this section.  To assess differences, a MANOVA was completed 
with gender and message received as between subjects variables and the various 
questions about ability to describe the suspect as dependent variables.  
Results showed that there was a main effect of message received, F(24, 925.69) = 
3.36, p < .001, Wilk’s λ = .75, ηp
2 
= .07.  Follow-up ANOVAs showed that for message 
received, there were significant effects for the questions ‘After being asked to generate an 
alibi yourself, what is the likelihood that you would be able to vouch for the suspect 
being at the bar?’, F(4, 270) = 14.72, p < .001, ηp
2 = .18, and ‘What is the likelihood that 
you could provide a description of the suspect if you spoke to him at the bar?’, F(4, 270) 
= 6.15, p < .001, ηp
2 
= .084.  Pairwise comparisons for the first question ‘After being 
asked to generate an alibi yourself, what is the likelihood that you would be able to vouch 
for the suspect being at the bar?’ revealed that participants who received the message 
saying they had correctly identified the suspect in the lineup (M = 4.35, SD = 1.78) were 
more likely to believe that they could vouch for the suspect being at the bar than those 
who received the message that they picked the wrong person in the lineup (M = 2.36, SD 
= 1.30; mean difference = 1.99, p < .001, 95% CI [1.27, 2.71]), those who received the 
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message that the suspect was in the lineup and they failed to choose anyone (M = 2.09, 
SD = 1.07 ; mean difference = 2.26, p < .001, 95% CI [1.55, 2.96]), those who received 
the message that they were correct, the suspect was not in the lineup (M = 3.35, SD = 
1.51 ; mean difference = 0.99, p = .003, 95% CI [0.34, 1.65]), and those who received the 
message that the suspect was not there but they incorrectly picked someone (M = 2.35, 
SD = 1.22 ; mean difference = 1.99, p < .001, 95% CI [1.35, 2.64]).  Those who received 
the message that they were correct that the suspect was not in the lineup were more likely 
to believe they could vouch for the suspect being at the bar than those who received the 
message that they picked the wrong person in the lineup (mean difference = 0.99, p = 
.004, 95% CI [0.32, 1.68]), those who received the message that the suspect was in the 
lineup and they failed to choose anyone (mean difference = 1.27, p < .001, 95% CI [0.60, 
1.93], and those who received the message that the suspect was not there but they 
incorrectly picked someone (mean difference = 1.01, p = .001, 95% CI [0.41, 1.60]).  
Pairwise comparisons for the second question, ‘What is the likelihood that you 
could provide a description of the suspect if you spoke to him at the bar?’ revealed that 
the participants who received the message saying that they had correctly identified the 
suspect in the lineup were more likely to believe that they could provide a description of 
the suspect (M = 4.86, SD = 1.59) than those who received the message that they picked 
the wrong person in the lineup (M = 3.34, SD = 1.56; mean difference = 1.52, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.70, 2.33]), those who received the message that the suspect was in the lineup 
and they failed to choose anyone (M = 3.39, SD = 1.63; mean difference = 1.47, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.67, 2.27]), those who received the message that they were correct, the suspect 
was not in the lineup (M = 3.95, SD = 1.51; mean difference = 0.91, p = .016, 95% CI 
  24 
 
[0.17, 1.65]), and those who received the message that the suspect was not there but they 
incorrectly picked someone (M = 3.20, SD = 1.64 ; mean difference = 1.66, p < .001, 
95% CI [0.93, 2.38]). Those who received the message that they were correct that the 
suspect was not in the lineup were more likely to believe they could provide a description 
of the suspect than those who received the message that the suspect was not in the lineup 
but they incorrectly picked someone (mean difference = 0.75, p = .030, 95% CI [0.07, 
1.42]).   
  
  25 
 
Discussion 
The current study was designed to identify specific areas of alibi generation that 
the public tended to distrust, and whether or not having to generate an alibi oneself would 
affect expectations of both suspects and of different types of alibi witnesses.  The study 
was structured around an online survey that contained both questions about expectations 
of alibi witnesses, and an exercise in which the participants were required to generate an 
alibi themselves. This was followed by a set of questions to identify any differences in 
expectations based on the participants’ own accuracy and feedback.  As seen in Figure 2, 
participants appear to have relatively high expectations of what an alibi would be 
expected to remember. When asked to indicate their perceptions of ability to vouch for 
the suspect, provide a description of the suspect, and to remember the suspect’s hair 
colour, height, and clothing, participants indicated moderate likelihood in alibi witness’ 
abilities to remember this information. Only eye colour was seen as a descriptor that 
alibis would have a low likelihood of remembering. It should come as no surprise then 
that people are hesitant to believe weak alibis often provided by individuals who are 
suspected of committing a crime (Olsen & Wells, 2012).  
In order to address differences in perceptions of alibis, three main hypotheses 
were proposed: it was hypothesized that participants would show a general disbelief of 
the suspect and have high expectations of the suspect’s ability to generate an alibi before 
having to generate an alibi themselves; it was also hypothesized that the participants 
would have varying expectations of different people (witness, bartender, participant 
him/herself); and finally, that there would be significant differences in expectations of the 
participants’ own ability to provide an alibi if they were correct compared to if they were 
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incorrect when they were asked to generate an alibi themselves.  Gender differences were 
also looked at in each section.  Results of this study showed support for two of the three 
preceding hypotheses.   
Believability of Suspects 
 The hypothesis for the believability portion of the study was that there would be 
a general skepticism of the suspect, and high expectations of what details he should 
remember about his location of alibi which was a bar.  This hypothesis was not 
supported, since on a scale from ‘not at all believable’ to ‘completely believable’, 
participants reported believability scores that were near the middle of the scale.  This 
finding is contradictory to several studies previously conducted such as Olsen and Wells’ 
(2012) study which highlighted the blatant skepticism people have of alibis as a form of 
evidence in the courtroom, even alibis corroborated with physical proof.  Research has 
shown that people tend to associate the word ‘alibi’ itself with guilt (Olsen, 2013).  It has 
been well-documented in previous literature that there is a skepticism among the general 
population about alibi believability (Culhane et al., 2013; Olsen & Charman, 2012; Olsen 
& Wells, 2012; Strange et al., 2015), thus this portion of the study was expected to yield 
results that paralleled previous research.  As such, the lack of significant findings in the 
current study is surprising.  
Although there were no significant findings in overall believability of the suspect, 
when ‘accuracy’ was used as an independent variable, results reflected a significant 
difference in believability between those who were later found to be accurate versus 
inaccurate.  Since the believability portion of the survey was completed prior to the 
participants’ knowledge of whether or not they were accurate, this analysis was not 
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conducted to see if knowledge of accuracy affected believability of the suspect, but to see 
if there were any differences in participants’ decision-making process.  It was found that 
there was a significant difference for two questions: ‘What is the likelihood that the 
suspect was at the bar at the time of the crime?’ and ‘If the suspect truly did not know 
people from the bar, what is the likelihood that he would remember the people that he 
met?’.  It was found that people who were later accurate in identifying the suspect were 
more likely to believe the suspect was at the bar than those who were inaccurate.  This is 
interesting because the participants did not know at the time that they answered questions 
about believability whether or not they would be able to generate an alibi themselves.  
There was no past research that highlighted this finding, thus it would be interesting for 
future research to elaborate on possible reasons for this outcome.  
 The second hypothesis of this study was that there would be differences in 
expectations depending on who was providing the alibi.  The questions in this section of 
the survey were divided into the participants’ expectations of alibi provision from a 
witness, who was a patron at the bar; the bartender working on the night of the crime; and 
of the participant him or herself.  The results of this portion of the study partially 
supported the hypothesis in that expectations of what should be remembered varied 
depending on who was providing the alibi; specifically in the case of the bartender and 
the participant him or herself.  Direct comparisons of the witness, bartender, and 
participant showed that participants thought both the bartender and the witness would be 
better able to vouch for the suspect, describe the suspect, and remember his hair colour, 
eye colour, height, and clothing than the participants themselves.  Similarly, participants 
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thought the bartender would be better able to vouch for the suspect, describe the suspect, 
and remember his eye colour, height, and clothing than the witness.  
It was found that there was a main effect of gender for the perceived ability of the 
bartender to describe the suspect.  Males believed that the bartender should be best able 
to provide a description and remember details about the suspect, such as his eye colour 
and what he was wearing, in comparison to what the participant should remember 
himself.  Not only is it a common stereotype that women are able to remember specific 
details about events better than men, research has shown that women do in fact tend to 
have a more detail-oriented autobiographical memory than do men (Grysman & Hudson, 
2013).  Due to this finding, it is not surprising that the men believed the bartender would 
be better able to remember small details about the suspect than they themselves would be. 
This is an important discovery because in the court of law, it is possible to encounter bias 
if the jury is made up of mostly or all male members, and the suspect or witness on trial is 
a female; expectations could be heightened or lessened depending on both juror gender 
and witness gender.  
It was found that there was an effect of accuracy of decision on expectations of 
what the participant him or herself should be able to remember about the suspect.  
Participants who were accurate believed they would be better able to vouch for and 
describe the suspect than those who were inaccurate.  This finding could be related to an 
inflated sense of self, due to the fact that the participant was correct.  Often, people tend 
to discredit the difficulty of a task if they succeed at said task, regardless of whether or 
not the success was due to chance or skill (Mamassian, 2008).  In this case, it is reflected 
in the current results that those who were successful had inflated expectations of 
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themselves and others in the ability to generate alibis, in comparison to those who were 
unsuccessful in accurately identifying the suspect.  Those who were unsuccessful in 
identifying the suspect had significantly lower expectations of themselves and of others 
in the perceived ability to generate an alibi, likely due to the realization of the difficulty 
of alibi generation.  Olsen and Wells (2012) looked at whether or not alibi generation 
would have an effect on expectations of alibi evaluators, and they found significant 
results that showed people who were required to generate an alibi themselves lowered 
their unrealistic expectations of the ease of generating an alibi.  The results of the present 
study suggest this may not always be the case and in fact, if participants are successful in 
completing an alibi generating task they may have an inflated sense of ability. 
The third hypothesis was that there would be a significant difference in 
participants’ expectations of themselves after receiving feedback as to whether or not 
they were accurate. Results supported the hypothesis in that those who received a positive 
message that reflected accuracy in choosing the suspect in the lineup believed that they 
could provide an alibi for the suspect better than those who received a negative message 
that they were incorrect.  As humans, we tend to lean toward self-preservation in many 
ways, including morality (Cheng & Hsu, 2012).  It is instinctual to defend oneself against 
the possibility of grave error in judgment which results in a severe negative consequence.  
For example, someone who aids in condemning a suspect of a crime to a lifetime in 
prison, later to find out that the suspect is innocent, will feel partly responsible for the 
fate of the suspect.  Upon realization of the error made, the person will naturally try to 
justify the decision that was made to maintain his/her positive self-regard (Cheng & Hsu, 
2012).  Based on this knowledge, it was hypothesized that those who received a negative 
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message, such as the failure to provide an alibi to an innocent person, would react 
negatively to the error and would lower expectations of others and themselves in the 
ability to provide an alibi.  This is in line with the cognitive dissonance theory, which 
suggests that people are more inclined to attempt to justify their decisions or actions that 
resulted in negative consequences to ease their guilt (Cheng & Hsu, 2012).  This is 
particularly important when the person who made the choice acted alone, and was 
personally responsible for the outcome, which is shown to have a more severe effect on 
the person’s sense of self-regard (Cheng & Hsu, 2012).  In this case, it is plausible to 
believe that the participants who received negative feedback tended to discredit the 
ability for anyone to provide an alibi for a suspect, as they were incorrect and thus felt 
responsible for the consequences (Cheng & Hsu, 2012). 
Limitations  
The current study provided insight into several facets of alibi expectations and 
effect of experience, however there were limitations.  One limitation is whether or not the 
suspect in the scenario had been under the influence of alcohol at the time he was said to 
be at the bar was not specified.  This may have influenced perceptions of the suspect’s 
believability, as the questions were along the lines of how believable the suspect is when 
he says he cannot remember specific events about the bar and the people in the bar.  It is 
possible that expectations of the suspect in this section were skewed depending on 
whether the participant believed the suspect was intoxicated or sober.  This flaw was not 
identified until the data had been collected, at which point nothing could be done.  This 
could be the reason the results for the believability section did not meet expectations 
based on previous research; people may have been more likely to believe that the suspect 
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could not remember due to the fact that the scene of the alibi was at a bar, and it is likely 
that the suspect was intoxicated.  
A second limitation was that the questions asked about believability were only 
asked at the beginning of the survey, and not asked again after the participant completed 
the lineup section of the survey.  Similarly, questions about the witness’ and bartenders’ 
ability were only asked before the lineup task and questions about the participants’ ability 
were only asked after the lineup task.  Since the questions were not asked before and 
after, there is no comparison data to see if there was an effect on overall believability of 
the suspect after the participant was asked to generate an alibi him or herself.  This was a 
significant limitation to this study, as it would be very interesting to see the overall effect 
on believability that alibi generation has.  
The final limitation was the large gender split.  There were approximately four 
times as many female participants as male participants.  Since there was an effect of 
gender in the results, those results should be viewed with caution as the variance in the 
gender split is large enough to possibly skew results.  
Future Research 
There is a vast amount of research left to do in the area of alibi perceptions. 
Future research that pertains specifically to the current study could include studies that 
look at why people tend to disbelieve alibi witnesses with no conceivable basis.  This is 
important because if the source of skepticism can be identified, it will be easier to 
generate ways to end the stigma surrounding alibis.  
Another area of research that should be looked at further would is gender related. 
Although the current study did address gender differences, the sample size was not quite 
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representative of the general population.  Therefore, a larger study with a more 
representative number of males and females could prove to be an asset to this area.  Also, 
pertaining to gender differences, it would be interesting to see if there are any gender 
differences in the perceptions of the suspect.  For example, would a male jury member be 
more skeptical of a male suspect or a female suspect?  Would a female jury member be 
more skeptical of a male suspect or a female suspect?  This is important because 
choosing a jury for a case could be largely impacted by gender if there appears to be a 
gender difference in skepticism.  
Furthermore, it would be interesting to investigate why participants tended to 
have higher expectations of other witnesses versus themselves.  The current study 
showed that participants tended to believe that a bartender and a patron at the bar, both of 
whom were strangers to the suspect, would be better able to provide an alibi for the 
suspect than themselves.  Admittedly, this may have been impeded by the failure to 
complete a pre/post lineup design.  However, it would be interesting to see if that changes 
based on the type of witness (e.g., bartender vs. patron), or the relationship between the 
witness and the suspect (i.e., motivated other, non-motivated other).  
Conclusion 
A major implication of the current study is the need to educate the general 
population about the difficulty with alibi generation. Since members of the general 
population are often responsible for crucial decision-making in the court of law through 
the use of a jury, it is imperative to educate those required to serve on the topic of alibi 
generation.  The lack of knowledge in this area is frightening, especially considering the 
exceptionally high number of wrongful conviction cases in which the accused provided 
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alibis (innocenceproject.org, 2016).  Fortunately, many cases have since been reopened 
as the use of DNA evidence has become standard practice; however, in cases that do not 
meet the DNA requirement, the only defense many suspects have is an alibi.  If a jury 
tends to disbelieve a suspect based on the sole fact that the word ‘alibi’ itself appears to 
carry a stigma of suspicion, or the belief that those who are innocent should have no 
trouble generating an alibi, the continuation of wrongful conviction is inevitable.  
Along with education, it is important to put alibi generation tasks to practical use. 
This can be done as preparation for jury members before a trial.  For example, members 
of the jury should be required to complete a short alibi generation task themselves before 
being permitted to serve.  This relates to the current study because it is clear that the 
general public has high expectations of what a suspect should remember about a specific 
time and scenario, and also what a witness should remember (Strange et al., 2014).  
Having to complete an alibi-generating exercise proved to be an effective tool in helping 
some people realize the difficulty of such a task, and thus created a better understanding 
of what realistic expectations they should have for court cases.  As highlighted in this 
study as compared to other similar studies, making the task difficult enough that only a 
minority of people, if any, could complete it successfully should illustrate the realism to 
potential jurors.   
In conclusion, the results of this study can be used practically in the justice system 
to prepare the general public for trial. It is important to recognize the difficulty that 
generating an alibi entails, and that many people who provide an alibi are looked upon 
with suspicion from the beginning.  If the results of this study can be incorporated into 
educating those responsible for making life-changing decisions on the behalf of others, 
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then the study will have served its purpose.  Education in the area of alibis is crucial at 
this point, as trial by jury is practiced in many cases and with many degrees of severity.  
With the fate of potentially innocent people on the line, it is necessary to exhaust all 
options in educating the public on the importance of fair judgment, and this can only be 
accomplished if the jury realizes what is and is not fair.  Inflated expectations of the 
suspect and of alibi witnesses prove to be detrimental in the court of law, and it is 
imperative to avoid wrongful conviction at all costs.  The results of this study show a 
clear need for more exposure to the difficulty of alibi generation within the general 
population so that those accused of a crime are able to receive a fair and just trial.  
 
  
  35 
 
References 
Cheng, P. Y., & Hsu, P. K. (2012). Cognitive dissonance theory and the certification 
examination: The role of responsibility. Social Behavior and Personality: An 
International Journal, 40, 1103-1111. doi: 10.2224/sbp.2012.40.7.1103 
Culhane, S. E., Kehn, A., Horgan, A. J., Meissner, C. A., Hosch, H. M., & Wodahl, E. J. 
(2013). Generation and detection of true and false alibi statements. Psychiatry, 
Psychology and Law, 20, 619-638. doi: 10.1080/13218719.2012.729018 
Dysart, J. E., & Strange, D. (2012). Beliefs about alibis and alibi investigations: A survey 
of law enforcement. Psychology, Crime and Law, 18, 11–25. doi: 
10.1080/106831X.2011.562867 
Grysman, A., & Hudson, J. A. (2013). Gender differences in autobiographical memory: 
Developmental and methodological considerations. Developmental Review, 33, 
239-272. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2013.07.004 
Lew, T. F., Pashler, H. E., & Vul, E. (2015). Fragile associations coexist with robust 
memories for precise details in long-term memory. Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 42, 379-393. doi: 
10.1037/xlm0000178 
Mamassian, P. (2008). Overconfidence in an objective anticipatory motor 
task. Psychological Science, 19, 601-606. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02129.x 
Marion, S. B., & Burke, T. M. (2013). False alibi corroboration: Witnesses lie for 
suspects who seem innocent, whether they like them or not. Law and Human 
Behavior, 37, 136-143. doi: 10.1037/lhb0000021 
  36 
 
Olson, E. A. (2013). “You don't expect me to believe that, do you?” Expectations 
influence recall and belief of alibi information. Journal of Applied Social 
Psychology, 43, 1238-1247. doi: 10.1111/jasp.12086 
Olson, E. A., & Charman, S. D. (2012). ‘But can you prove it?’–Examining the quality of 
innocent suspects' alibis. Psychology, Crime & Law, 18, 453-471. doi: 
10.1080/1068316X.2010.505567 
Olson, E. A., & Wells, G. L. (2004). What makes a good alibi? A proposed 
taxonomy. Law and Human Behavior, 28, 157-176. doi: 
10.1023/B:LAHU.0000022320.47112.d3 
Olson, E. A., & Wells, G. L. (2012). The alibi‐generation effect: Alibi‐generation 
experience influences alibi evaluation. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 17,
 151-164. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-8333.2010.02003.x 
Pozzulo, J., Bennell, C., & Forth, A. (2015). Forensic psychology (4
th
 ed.). Toronto, ON: 
Pearson. 
Strange, D., Dysart, J., & Loftus, E. F. (2015). Why errors in alibis are not necessarily 
evidence of guilt. Applied Memory Research, 222, 82-89. doi: 10.1027/2151-
2604/a000169 
  
  37 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Participants’ perceptions of overall believability of the suspect. 
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Figure 2. Participants’ perceptions of the ability to remember a suspect as a function of 
the person providing the alibi. 
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Appendix A 
Informed Consent Form 
The purpose of this informed consent form is to ensure you understand the nature 
of this study and your involvement in it. This consent form will provide information 
about the study, giving you the opportunity to decide if you want to participate.  
Researchers: This study is being conducted by Heidi Abbott as part of the course 
requirements for Psychology 4951. I am under the supervision of Dr. Kelly Warren.  
Purpose: The study is designed to investigate people’s perceptions of crime. The results 
will be used to write a lab report as part of the course requirements. The study may also 
be used in a larger research project and may be published in the future. 
Task Requirements: You will be asked to complete a short survey assessing your 
perceptions of a crime. You may omit any questions you do not wish to answer.  
Duration: The survey will take approximately 10 minutes to complete. 
Anonymity and Confidentiality: Your responses are anonymous and confidential. 
Please do not put any identifying marks on any of the pages. IP addresses will not be 
collected. All information will be analyzed and reported on a group basis. Thus, 
individual responses cannot be identified. 
Right to Withdraw: Your participation in this research is totally voluntary and you are 
free to stop participating at any time. However, once you complete this survey and click 
submit, your data cannot be removed because we are not collecting any identifying 
information and therefore we cannot link individuals to their responses. Although I am 
not collecting any identifying information, The online survey company, Survey Monkey, 
hosting this survey is located in the United States and as such is subject to U.S. laws. The 
U.S Patriot Act allows authorities access to the records of internet service providers. 
Therefore anonymity and confidentiality cannot be guaranteed. If you choose to 
participate in this survey, you understand that your responses to the survey questions will 
be stored and may be access in the ISA. The security and privacy policy for the web 
survey company can be found at the following link:  
http://www.SurveyMonkey.com/monkey_privacy.aspx.  
Contact Information: If you have any questions or concerns about the study, please feel 
free to contact me at habbott@grenfell.mun.ca, or my supervisor, Dr. Kelly Warren, at 
kwarren@grenfell.mun.ca. As well, if you are interested in knowing the results of the 
study, please contact me or Dr. Warren after May 2016.  
This study has been approved by an ethics review process in the psychology program at 
Grenfell Campus, Memorial University of Newfoundland has found to be in compliance 
with Memorial University’s ethics policy. 
By proceeding to the next page, consent is implied.  
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Appendix B 
Bar Photo 
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Appendix C 
Lineups 
Suspect Present 
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Suspect Absent 
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Appendix D 
Scenario 
At 2:15am on a quiet side street located close to a local bar, a woman was 
assaulted, and her purse was stolen. The woman gave police a detailed description, and 
said that there was $65.00 in her wallet. A suspect who fit the description was arrested 
near the location of the crime shortly after with $80 in his wallet. The suspect claims that 
he was drinking at the local bar that was on the same street where he was arrested. Police 
asked the suspect if he had anyone who could corroborate his story, and he said that he 
was drinking alone and didn’t know anyone at the bar. He said he had socialized with a 
few people, but did not learn their names and did not give out his name. When asked 
what time he was at the bar, he said sometime between 1am-2:30am, that he was not 
really sure. He was unable to answer any questions about details of the bar, or of the 
people he supposedly befriended.  
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Appendix E 
Questionnaire 
Pre-Lineup Believability Questions 
1. What is the likelihood that the suspect was at the bar at the time of the crime? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very likely 
 
2. How believable is the suspect when he says he cannot remember any information 
about the bar? 
Not at all believable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very 
believable 
 
3. How reasonable is it that the suspect said he cannot remember what time he was 
at the bar drinking? 
Not at all reasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very 
reasonable 
 
4. If the suspect truly did not know people from the bar, what is the likelihood that 
he would remember the people that he met?  
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
Pre-Lineup Questions (Bartender, Witness, Gender Randomly Assigned) 
 
5. A (witness/bartender) who was at the bar at the time of the crime, was brought 
into the police station for questioning. What is the likelihood that the 
(witness/bartender) can vouch for the suspect being at the bar? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
6. What is the likelihood that the (witness/bartender) could provide a description of 
the suspect if he spoke to him at the bar? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
7. How likely is it that the (witness/bartender) would remember the colour of the 
suspect’s hair? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
8. How likely is it that the (witness/bartender) would remember the colour of the 
suspect’s eyes? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
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9. How likely is it that the (witness/bartender) would remember how tall the suspect 
was? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
10. How likely is it that the (witness/bartender) would remember what the suspect 
was wearing? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
11. What is the likelihood that the suspect did in fact commit the crime? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
Post-Lineup Questions (Participant) 
1. After being asked to generate an alibi yourself, what is the likelihood that you 
would be able to vouch for the suspect being at the bar? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
2. What is the likelihood that you could provide a description of the suspect if you 
spoke to him at the bar? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
3. How likely is it that you would remember the colour of the suspect’s hair? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
4. How likely is it that you would remember the colour of the suspect’s eyes? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
5. How likely is it that you would remember how tall the suspect was? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
6. How likely is it that you would remember what the suspect was wearing? 
Not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Very Likely 
 
Demographics 
1. How old are you? (open-ended) 
2. What is your gender? (male; female; other) 
3. What is your nationality/ethnicity? (open-ended) 
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Appendix F 
Debriefing 
Thank you for your participation in this study.  The study is being conducted to determine 
what people believe alibis should remember.  The people in the photos presented are 
members of the general public and were not involved in any crime.  These individuals 
simply agreed to have their photos included in the study as I was interested in whether 
having to fabricate an alibi changes people’s perceptions of alibis.  Please feel free to 
share the link for this study with people who might be willing to participate.  If you have 
any questions or concerns or if you are interested in learning more about this study, 
please feel free to contact myself or my supervisor at habbott@grenfell.mun.ca or 
kwarren@grenfell.mun.ca.  If you are interested in learning the results of this study, 
please attend the Psychology Undergraduate Student Research Conference later this 
semester or contact my supervisor after May 2016. 
Thank you for your participation. 
 
